"Without rations, without baggage of any kind, leaving our knapsacks packed in our tents...we left the camp under orders to proceed to the front, following the four guns of the Fifth Ohio. We had not proceeded over three-quarters of a mile when the latter pulled out to the left of the road and commenced to get into battery. We formed on the right of the road, but before we had unlimbered, the rebels, whom we saw skulking through the woods, opened on us, and one man (Stinson) fell shot through the neck, while three others (Lammers, Davis and Blood) were wounded." (15)
In spite of the casualties, the First Minnesota hurried into position and fired the first artillery shots of the day. (16) The battle began in earnest with the two artillery units rapidly launching canister rounds across Spain field even though they were under heavy musket fire from the Confederates. The Union infantry could not hold the line and began to withdraw until the two batteries stood alone without a single infantryman to support them. (17) First Lieutenant William Pfaender recalled, “...very soon, instead of being covered by our infantry, we were left behind alone covering the retreat of our running protectors.” (18) Captain Munch and the Fifth Ohio's Captain Hickenloper recognized their precarious position and ordered a retreat. The Fifth Ohio had already lost two of its guns to the Confederates and made a wild dash for safety behind Prentiss' lines. The First Minnesota followed quickly under intense fire. One driver was wounded and veered to the side. His gun became stuck between two trees, and its carriage broke. The driver and gun were soon rescued and pulled off to safety. Captain Munch's horse was shot out from under him, and Munch himself was hit in the thigh by a musket ball as he was trying to unbuckle his saddle. His injury was severe enough to put him out of commission for the rest of the battle, and Lieutenants Pfaender and Peebles took over command. (19)
The First Minnesota reformed its battery near their original campsite, facing a log house and barricades constructed by the Confederates. From here they resumed their fire. One of the center guns was soon disabled when a shell jammed in it. Several men, including Henry Hurter, moved the gun off the battlefield to the rear, hoping to swap out the disabled gun for the one with the broken carriage. These men did not rejoin the battle. (20)
Soon the First Minnesota's new position was nearly overrun. As Prentiss' infantry once again retreated, the Confederates pressed closely on the battery, which continued to fire as long as it could. (21) A short time later, the First Minnesota was forced to retreat amidst the chaos of fleeing Union soldiers and attacking Confederates. Lieutenant Pfaender, unwilling to surrender, rode out to seek an officer for further orders. He found General Prentiss, who was trying to rally his shaken troops. Prentiss ordered Pfaender to reform the First Minnesota on an elevated piece of land facing an open field. A Missouri battery set up immediately to the First Minnesota's left, and the two units were prepared for action by about eleven o'clock. (22) Historian Ronald E. McRoberts describes what happened next:
"For hours the Confederates dashed against this line, attacking again and again, pounding the Union positions with the accompaniment of artillery. Each time the attack was repelled. The losses of the Confederates were great, and it became difficult for their officers to rally their men and lead them to renewed attack. Twice rebel batteries were placed in the timber at the further edge of the field to dislodge the Union artillery, but before they were able to get the range, the First Minnesota silenced them. The left section of the battery, under Lieutenant Peebles, bore the brunt of the battle. Several times it repelled determined rebel charges. It was badly cut up, but inflicted terrible losses on the enemy by mowing them down with canister at close range. To the Confederate survivors of one charge, the stinging blasts of Union artillery seemed like facing a swarm of hornets, and they termed the Union stronghold, 'the Hornet's Nest.'" (23)
All afternoon, brigade after brigade of Confederate infantry charged across the open field toward the position of the First Minnesota, who held strong and repulsed each attack. The Confederate forces soon tired and became less and less willing to attempt frontal assaults on the Hornet's Nest. Confederate commanders decided to try another approach in their attempts to dislodge the Union artillery. Part of the Union force had already begun to fall back about mid-afternoon; the soldiers were simply exhausted, but this withdrawal had dangerously exposed the flank of the First Minnesota. (24)
About five o'clock, the First Minnesota noticed that they were actually receiving fire from the rear. The Confederates had surreptitiously made their way through the gap left by retreating Union infantry to attack Union artillery from another angle. General Wallace, the commander currently in charge, gave the order to retreat. The First Minnesota quickly obeyed, dashing through the last gap in the Confederate lines with the enemy's infantry making vigorous attempts to cut them off. The battery swung around on a piece of high ground, formed quickly, and fired canister at the approaching Confederates, who drew back enough to allow the First Minnesota to make their escape. (25) The First Minnesota had suffered several casualties, including Privates Colby Stinson, Ole Taxdahl, and Richard Tilson, who were killed; Corporals C.S. Davis and George Lammers, who were mortally wounded; Captain Emil Munch, Lieutenant Ferd Peebles, and Sergeants William Clayton and Jesse Conner, who were severely wounded; and several others who were slightly wounded. (26) The unit did manage to stay together and reach safety behind Union lines with all its guns still in its possession, but General Prentiss, the unit's commander during most of the battle, was captured along with over two thousand other Union soldiers. (27)
The Union set up a new battle line along the bluffs of the Tennessee River with the First Minnesota forming on the army's left flank in support of a battery of heavy artillery siege guns, which were prepared to check any further Confederate advances. (28) The Confederates, however, were exhausted and running out of ammunition, and while they tried to rally and attack the new Union position, they were driven back by the First Minnesota and other Union batteries who had lined up along the bluffs. (29) As night fell, the battle ended for the day, and Union soldiers made their camp at the battle line.
The second day of the Battle of Shiloh was quite different from the first. Lieutenant Pfaender reported early in the morning to General Ulysses S. Grant to present his battery as ready for service. He was instructed to remain in position and be ready to enter into active duty. The order never came. Twenty thousand fresh Union troops had arrived during the night, and while the Confederates fought hard to retain the ground won the previous day, they were forced back, and by two o'clock, the Confederate commander, General P.G.T. Beauregard, ordered his army to withdraw, leaving the Union victorious. The First Minnesota was never called to participate in the second day's battle, probably to their great relief. (30)
In the midst of the chaos of battle, the First Minnesota's role in the Battle of Shiloh went without proper recognition for many years. In an 1888 lecture in White Bear Lake, Minnesota, General Prentiss acknowledged this oversight and asserted that “it was mainly due to the excellent work done by this battery that the 'Hornet's Nest,' with it comparatively small force of men, held out for so long against the overwhelming numbers of the enemy.” (31) Indeed, the First Minnesota's success in repelling charge after charge of Confederate soldiers prevented the Confederates from overrunning the Union lines, allowed Union infantry to retreat to safety more than once, and inflicted significant damage on the Confederate forces, weakening them and limiting their effectiveness against the Union stronghold along the Tennessee River bluffs. “One thing is sure,” wrote Lieutenant Henry Hurter, “and I defy anyone to deny the truth, that had the forces...not stood up so heroically and valiantly to their task, nothing would have prevented Beauregard and his hosts from the execution of his threat to drive us into the Tennessee.” (32)
13. Hurter, 640.
14. Ibid.; McRoberts, 3.
15. Hurter, 640.
16. Ibid, 642
17. McRoberts, 3-4.
18. Pfaender.
19. McRoberts, 4.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid., 5; Hurter, 642-643.
23. McRoberts, 5.
24. Ibid., 6.
25. Ibid.
26. Hurter, 644.
27. Ibid, 643; “Benjamin Prentiss,” Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Prentiss (accessed July 18, 2011).
28. McRoberts, 6-7.
29. Ibid., 7.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Hurter, 641.
In spite of the casualties, the First Minnesota hurried into position and fired the first artillery shots of the day. (16) The battle began in earnest with the two artillery units rapidly launching canister rounds across Spain field even though they were under heavy musket fire from the Confederates. The Union infantry could not hold the line and began to withdraw until the two batteries stood alone without a single infantryman to support them. (17) First Lieutenant William Pfaender recalled, “...very soon, instead of being covered by our infantry, we were left behind alone covering the retreat of our running protectors.” (18) Captain Munch and the Fifth Ohio's Captain Hickenloper recognized their precarious position and ordered a retreat. The Fifth Ohio had already lost two of its guns to the Confederates and made a wild dash for safety behind Prentiss' lines. The First Minnesota followed quickly under intense fire. One driver was wounded and veered to the side. His gun became stuck between two trees, and its carriage broke. The driver and gun were soon rescued and pulled off to safety. Captain Munch's horse was shot out from under him, and Munch himself was hit in the thigh by a musket ball as he was trying to unbuckle his saddle. His injury was severe enough to put him out of commission for the rest of the battle, and Lieutenants Pfaender and Peebles took over command. (19)
The First Minnesota reformed its battery near their original campsite, facing a log house and barricades constructed by the Confederates. From here they resumed their fire. One of the center guns was soon disabled when a shell jammed in it. Several men, including Henry Hurter, moved the gun off the battlefield to the rear, hoping to swap out the disabled gun for the one with the broken carriage. These men did not rejoin the battle. (20)
Soon the First Minnesota's new position was nearly overrun. As Prentiss' infantry once again retreated, the Confederates pressed closely on the battery, which continued to fire as long as it could. (21) A short time later, the First Minnesota was forced to retreat amidst the chaos of fleeing Union soldiers and attacking Confederates. Lieutenant Pfaender, unwilling to surrender, rode out to seek an officer for further orders. He found General Prentiss, who was trying to rally his shaken troops. Prentiss ordered Pfaender to reform the First Minnesota on an elevated piece of land facing an open field. A Missouri battery set up immediately to the First Minnesota's left, and the two units were prepared for action by about eleven o'clock. (22) Historian Ronald E. McRoberts describes what happened next:
"For hours the Confederates dashed against this line, attacking again and again, pounding the Union positions with the accompaniment of artillery. Each time the attack was repelled. The losses of the Confederates were great, and it became difficult for their officers to rally their men and lead them to renewed attack. Twice rebel batteries were placed in the timber at the further edge of the field to dislodge the Union artillery, but before they were able to get the range, the First Minnesota silenced them. The left section of the battery, under Lieutenant Peebles, bore the brunt of the battle. Several times it repelled determined rebel charges. It was badly cut up, but inflicted terrible losses on the enemy by mowing them down with canister at close range. To the Confederate survivors of one charge, the stinging blasts of Union artillery seemed like facing a swarm of hornets, and they termed the Union stronghold, 'the Hornet's Nest.'" (23)
All afternoon, brigade after brigade of Confederate infantry charged across the open field toward the position of the First Minnesota, who held strong and repulsed each attack. The Confederate forces soon tired and became less and less willing to attempt frontal assaults on the Hornet's Nest. Confederate commanders decided to try another approach in their attempts to dislodge the Union artillery. Part of the Union force had already begun to fall back about mid-afternoon; the soldiers were simply exhausted, but this withdrawal had dangerously exposed the flank of the First Minnesota. (24)
About five o'clock, the First Minnesota noticed that they were actually receiving fire from the rear. The Confederates had surreptitiously made their way through the gap left by retreating Union infantry to attack Union artillery from another angle. General Wallace, the commander currently in charge, gave the order to retreat. The First Minnesota quickly obeyed, dashing through the last gap in the Confederate lines with the enemy's infantry making vigorous attempts to cut them off. The battery swung around on a piece of high ground, formed quickly, and fired canister at the approaching Confederates, who drew back enough to allow the First Minnesota to make their escape. (25) The First Minnesota had suffered several casualties, including Privates Colby Stinson, Ole Taxdahl, and Richard Tilson, who were killed; Corporals C.S. Davis and George Lammers, who were mortally wounded; Captain Emil Munch, Lieutenant Ferd Peebles, and Sergeants William Clayton and Jesse Conner, who were severely wounded; and several others who were slightly wounded. (26) The unit did manage to stay together and reach safety behind Union lines with all its guns still in its possession, but General Prentiss, the unit's commander during most of the battle, was captured along with over two thousand other Union soldiers. (27)
The Union set up a new battle line along the bluffs of the Tennessee River with the First Minnesota forming on the army's left flank in support of a battery of heavy artillery siege guns, which were prepared to check any further Confederate advances. (28) The Confederates, however, were exhausted and running out of ammunition, and while they tried to rally and attack the new Union position, they were driven back by the First Minnesota and other Union batteries who had lined up along the bluffs. (29) As night fell, the battle ended for the day, and Union soldiers made their camp at the battle line.
The second day of the Battle of Shiloh was quite different from the first. Lieutenant Pfaender reported early in the morning to General Ulysses S. Grant to present his battery as ready for service. He was instructed to remain in position and be ready to enter into active duty. The order never came. Twenty thousand fresh Union troops had arrived during the night, and while the Confederates fought hard to retain the ground won the previous day, they were forced back, and by two o'clock, the Confederate commander, General P.G.T. Beauregard, ordered his army to withdraw, leaving the Union victorious. The First Minnesota was never called to participate in the second day's battle, probably to their great relief. (30)
In the midst of the chaos of battle, the First Minnesota's role in the Battle of Shiloh went without proper recognition for many years. In an 1888 lecture in White Bear Lake, Minnesota, General Prentiss acknowledged this oversight and asserted that “it was mainly due to the excellent work done by this battery that the 'Hornet's Nest,' with it comparatively small force of men, held out for so long against the overwhelming numbers of the enemy.” (31) Indeed, the First Minnesota's success in repelling charge after charge of Confederate soldiers prevented the Confederates from overrunning the Union lines, allowed Union infantry to retreat to safety more than once, and inflicted significant damage on the Confederate forces, weakening them and limiting their effectiveness against the Union stronghold along the Tennessee River bluffs. “One thing is sure,” wrote Lieutenant Henry Hurter, “and I defy anyone to deny the truth, that had the forces...not stood up so heroically and valiantly to their task, nothing would have prevented Beauregard and his hosts from the execution of his threat to drive us into the Tennessee.” (32)
13. Hurter, 640.
14. Ibid.; McRoberts, 3.
15. Hurter, 640.
16. Ibid, 642
17. McRoberts, 3-4.
18. Pfaender.
19. McRoberts, 4.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid., 5; Hurter, 642-643.
23. McRoberts, 5.
24. Ibid., 6.
25. Ibid.
26. Hurter, 644.
27. Ibid, 643; “Benjamin Prentiss,” Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Prentiss (accessed July 18, 2011).
28. McRoberts, 6-7.
29. Ibid., 7.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Hurter, 641.
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